Principal-agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for Virtual Enterprise by Huang, M et al.
Title Principal-agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for VirtualEnterprise
Author(s) Huang, M; Chen, K; Ching, WK; Siu, KTK
Citation Journal of Service Science and Management, 2010, v. 3 n. 2, p.241-249
Issued Date 2010
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/224725
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
J. Service Science & Management, 2010, 3, 241-249 
doi:10.4236/jssm.2010.32029 Published Online June 2010 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/jssm) 
Copyright © 2010 SciRes.                                                                                JSSM 
Principal-Agent Theory Based Risk Allocation 
Model for Virtual Enterprise 
Min Huang1, Guike Chen1*, Wai-Ki Ching2, Tak Kuen Siu3 
 
1College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Key Laboratory of Integrated Automation of Process Industry 
(Northeastern University), Ministry of Education, Shenyang, China; 2Department of Mathematics, The University of Hong Kong, 
Hong Kong, China; 3Department of Actuarial Studies, Faculty of Business and Economics, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. 
Email: mhuang@mail.neu.edu.cn, guikechen@sina.com.cn 
 
Received February 3rd, 2010; revised March 19th, 2010; accepted April 29th, 2010. 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we consider a risk analysis model for Virtual Enterprise (VE) by exploring the state of the art of the prin-
cipal-agent theory. In particular, we deal with the problem of allocating the cost of risk between two parties in a VE, 
namely, the owner and the partner(s). We first consider the case of a single partner of VE with symmetric information 
or asymmetric information and then the case of multiple partners. We also build a model for the optimal contract of the 
risk allocation based on the principal-agent theory and analyze it through specific example. At last we consider the case 
of multiple principal with potentially many partners based on common agency. 
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1. Introduction 
Virtual Enterprise (VE) is a dynamic alliance composed 
of independent individual enterprises which locate in 
different area. It’s designed to adapt to rapidly changing 
market opportunities, so as to achieve the sharing of 
skills, core competencies and resources [1,2]. Based on 
this concept, on one hand, member enterprises in a VE, 
which are geographically distributed, keep their inde-
pendence and autonomy. On the other hand, they provide 
their own core competencies in different areas such as 
marketing, engineering and manufacturing to the VE. 
When new market requirements arise and individual en-
terprises do not have all necessary skills and competen-
cies to undertake these requirements independently, by 
combining specific expertise of other enterprises, it is 
possible to create a VE which is capable of responding to 
the new requirements. In a certain sense, the essence of 
VE has its basis in an early and fundamental concept of 
economics, namely, the division of labor, which has its 
origin in the classics, namely, the wealth of nations, by 
Adam Smith first published in 1776. 
In spite of substantial advantages of VE, there are lots 
of risks associated with it, these risks include investment 
risk [3], operation risk [4], moral hazard [5,6] and market 
risk, and so on. These incomplete nesses arises from 
member enterprises not having sufficient background 
information about the other member enterprises or about 
market environment in which the VE has to operate. The 
investigation of the structure, operations and economic 
implications of a VE has received much interest among 
researchers in the field. Much attention has been paid on 
some aspects of VE, such as partner selection [7,8], op-
eration management [9], information exchanges [10] and 
their scales. However, an important issue, the risk man-
agement of VE, has not been well-explored and ad-
dressed until recently. Since virtual enterprises (VEs) are 
profit driven, it is one of the key issues to the successful 
running of VEs whether they could construct reasonable 
and efficient risk allocation mechanism in the operation 
process to prevent some members from gaining profit by 
harming others. The establishment of a VE can not re-
duce or eliminate the risk due to the uncertainty of mar-
ket opportunities and production capacities. The risk of 
the whole enterprise is re-distributed among different 
members in the VE. There are some ways to mitigate the 
risk in the cooperation process, such as partner selection 
[11,12], cooperation contract design [12], and coordina-
tion mechanism design [13]. After reviewing the related 
literature, we found out that researchers have carried out 
certain publications on VE’s risk. 
Based on the research of risk in supply chain [14], it 
produces partnerships [6] and joint ventures [15]. We 
consider a risk allocation model for VE by exploring the 
state of the art of the principal-agent theory. In particular, 
we deal with the problem of allocating the cost of risk 
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between two parties in a VE, namely, the owner and the 
partners. Our analysis invokes some basic and important 
concepts for the risk analysis, including utility function, 
risk-aversion level, principal-agent theory [16] and com-
mon agency [17,18]. Here we first deal with the case of a 
single partner of VE with symmetric information or 
asymmetric information. Then, the model is extended to 
deal with the case of multiple partners. We also build a 
model for the optimal contract of the risk allocation 
based on the principal-agent theory. At last we extend the 
principal-agent framework with risk-neutral principals to 
situations in which several principals simultaneously and 
independently attempt to influence a common agent. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we give a brief discussion on some basic concepts 
of risk analysis and related assumptions. In Section 3, we 
present our risk allocation models. In Section 4, a spe-
cific example is given to demonstrate our models in sec-
tion 3. In Section 5, we discuss the incentive mechanism 
on the basis of common agency [18,19] when the rela-
tionships between the principals is competition. Finally 
concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
2. Basic Concepts and Assumptions 
In this section, we provide a brief discussion on some 
basic concepts of risk analysis, namely, the utility func-
tion, the risk aversion and the principal-agent theory, in 
the context of VE which involving an owner and  
risk-averse member enterprises (partners). These con-
cepts also play fundamental and important role in finan-
cial economics and corporate finance. Then summarize 
the major notations to be used in this paper and give the 
assumptions. 
n
First of all, utility can be considered as goods or ser-
vices that meet the needs of consumer’s ability or desire. 
The utility function is defined as a mapping function 
which maps goods or services to consumer preferences. 
Let x denote the receipts or earnings of a member enter-
prise. Then, the utility function is given by ( )x , which 
is interpreted as goods or services that meet the member 
enterprise’s preference. It is a representation of the mem- 
ber attitude towards risk. 
The degree of risk aversion is an important characteri-
zation of a utility function. To measure the degree of risk 
aversion, Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) introduce the 
celebrated Arrow-Pratt ratio of risk aversion level given 
as follows. 
''
'
( )( )
( )
       
Principal-agent theory tries to model the following 
types of questions. One participant (principal) wants to 
participate in another person (agent) in accordance with 
the interests of his choice of action, but the principal can 
not observe directly the agent’s actions. What can only 
be observed are some other variables? These variables 
are decided by the agent’s action and other random fac-
tors. The principal’s problem is how to incentives the 
agents in accordance with the information observed to 
encourage their agents to choose the most favorable ac-
tions. The principal-agent model is built to analyze the 
optimal contract with asymmetric information. To solve 
the problem conveniently, we consider the optimal con-
tract with symmetric information. The central issue of 
principal-agent relationship is the alternating between 
insurance and incentive. 
To facilitate our discussion, we define the following 
notations and impose the following assumptions: 
a , partner’s manpower contributing to the project (the 
productive effort of the partner); 
1
r
i i
i
t 

  , the random variables that not be con-
trolled by the alliance, where 1, 2,..., r    are independ-
ent risk factors; 
2 , the variance of  ; 
( ), ( )g G  , the probability density function and the 
distribution function of  , respectively; 
( , )a  , the monetary income (outputs) of the alli-
ance; 
( , )f a , the probability density function of  ; 
( )s x , the incentive contract (a way to repay partner); 
( ), ( )v x u x , the owner’s and partner’s utility function 
respectively; 
u , the reservations utility (the greatest utility that part-
ners do not accept the contract); 
P , the owner’s risk aversion level; 
A , the partner’s risk aversion level; 
( )C a , cost function of the effort . a
In this paper, we consider an owner and several mem-
ber enterprises (partners) in a VE. Each partner chooses a 
level of productive effort  and a level of risk aver-
sion 
0a 
 . Both productive effort  and risk aversion 
level 
a
  are individually costly to partners and we as-
sume that the two actions are stochastically independent 
and the cost of actions can be expressed in monetary 
units. 
3. The Risk Allocation Models 
In this section, we present the risk allocation model un-
der the assumptions in section 2 based on principal-agent 
theory which involving an owner and one or  risk- 
averse partners. We first deal with the case of a single 
partner of VE with symmetric information and asymmet-
ric information (hidden action) respectively. Then, the 
n
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model is extended to deal with the case of multiple part-
ners. 
3.1 The Optimal Contract of Risk Allocation 
with Symmetric Information to a Single 
Partner 
In this subsection, we consider the case that the owner 
can observe the partner’s action (the productive effort) 
involving an owner and a risk-averse partner in a VE. As 
the partner’s action can be observed, the owner can force 
the partner to choose the ideal productive effort, so the 
incentive is surplus. 
The risk allocation model is given as follows: Give a 
, the output is a simple random variable; the owner’s 
objective is to maximize the utility of its own profit by 
allocating the total revenue from the VE project includ-
ing choosing 
a
( )s  : 
     
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( , )
s
E v s v s f a d        

  (1) 
     
     
. .( ) ,s t IR u s f a d C a
E u s C a u
  


  

            (2) 
Equation (2) is the partner’s individual rationality con-
straint (IR). We then construct the Lagrange function as 
below: 
   
 
( ) ( ) ( , )
               ( ) ( , ) ( )
L s v s f a d
u s f a d C a u
    
   
  
 

        (3) 
The partial derivative of the function with respect to 
( )s   is given by 
     ' ' 0v s u s                (4) 
Therefore, we have 
  
  
'
'
v s
u s
  


                 (5) 
The Lagrange multiplier is a strictly positive constant 
in (5) (because (2) strictly satisfied).The corresponding 
optimal condition shows that the ratio of marginal utility 
of income of the owner and partner is a constant, no rela-
tion with the output and uncertain variables  . 
The optimal condition of (5) implicitly defined the op-
timal contract  s  , from implicit function theorem, the 
partial derivative with respect to   is: 
'' ''1 0ds dsv u
d d
 
                   (6) 
Combining the above equations, we get 
p
A p
ds
d

  

                 (7) 
where 
''
'P
v
v
    and 
''
'A
u
u
    
Let          P
A P
ds
d
    

            (8) 
Then we have    
0
s t dt

                  (9) 
In particular, if P  and A  are constants (no rela-
tion among their level of income), then the optimal con-
tract is linear, i.e. 
 s                     (10) 
We define RC  to be the risk cost of the alliance 
project. Now, the improved risk programming model is 
given as follows:  
2 21min
2 A
RC   
      
Such that 
     
     
,
  
u s f a d C a
E u s C a u
  


  

  RC R 
   arg max ( )E v s     
3.2 The Optimal Contract of Risk Allocation 
with Asymmetric Information to a Single 
Partner 
In this subsection, we consider the case that the owner 
can’t observe the partner’s action (the productive effort) 
involving an owner and a risk-averse partner in a VE. As 
the partner’s action is hidden, the owner has to incentive 
the partner to choose the ideal productive effort, i.e., the 
partner chooses action  to maximize the utility of its 
own profit, where the owner cannot observe the value of 
. We seek for maximizing the partner’s expected util-
ity: 
a
a
       max ,
a
u s f a d C a           (11) 
Equation (12) is the incentive compatibility constraints 
(IC).The partial derivative with respect to  is: a
      ', 0au s f a d C a             (12) 
i.e., IC constraint can be replaced by the first-order ap-
proach of (13). We then consider maximizing the utility 
of the owner’s profit: 
     
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( , )
s
E v s v s f a d          (13) 
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Such that 
     
     
,
   
u s f a d C a
E u s C a u
  


 



       (14) 
and               (15)      ',au s f a d C a   
Now, we construct the Lagrange function: 
   
  
       '
( ) ( ) ( , )
              ( ) ( , ) ( )
              ,a
L s v s f a d
u s f a d C a u
u s f a d C a
    
   
   
 
 
 



    (16) 
where   and   are the Lagrange multipliers of par-
ticipation constraint and the incentive constraint, respec-
tively. The optimal condition is given as follows: 
  
  
 '
'
,
( , )
a
v s f a
f au s
    


           (17) 
By comparing with (5), it shows that, if the owner 
cannot observe , the Pareto efficiency risk allocation is 
impossible. As 
a
0  (Holmstrom proved in 1979), in 
order to motivate the partner to work hard, it has to bare 
more risks. 
3.3 The Optimal Contract of Risk Allocation 
with Symmetric Information to Multiple 
Partners 
In this subsection, we discuss the case of symmetric in-
formation with multiple partners that the owner can ob-
serve the partner’s action (the productive effort) involv-
ing an owner and  risk-averse partners in a VE. We 
first define the following notations and assumptions. 
n
i , partner  ; i ( 1, 2,..., )i n
[0, )ia   , the productive effort of partner ; i
 i iC a , the cost function of partner ; strictly in-
creasing convex differentiable function, and 
i
 0 0iC  ; 
 1 2, ,..., na a a a  , the vector of all partners’ produc-
tive efforts; 
( )x a , the common output decided by a, strictly in-
creasing concave differentiable function and (0) 0x  ; 
( , )a  , monetary income (outputs); 
 1 2, , ,..., n f a a a , the probability density function of 
 ;  
iA
 , the partner i’s risk aversion level; 
 is  , the revenue sharing factor of the partner. 
As the owner can observe the partners’ actions, the 
owner doesn’t need to incentive the partners, its objective 
is to maximize the utility of its own profit by allocating 
the total revenue from the VE project including choosing 
 is  ( 1, 2,..., )i n . Similar to subsection 1, the model 
is presented as below: 
       
   
1 2, ,..., 1
1 2
1
max
, , ,...,
n
n
is s s i
n
i n
i
E v s
v s f a a a
    
d  


           
    

 
    (18) 
Such that  
      1 2, , ,...,
  ( 1, 2,..., )
i i n i i iu s f a a a d C a u
i n
    

   (19) 
Again, we construct the Lagrangian function as fol-
lows: 
      
   
       
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
1
, ,...,
, , ,...,
   , , ,...,
n
n
i n
i
n
i i i n i i i
i
L s s s
v s f a a a d
u s f a a a d C a u
  
   
   


    
 

  
 
(20) 
i ( 1, 2,..., )i n are the Lagrange multipliers and are 
strictly positive constants in (21). We then consider the 
first-order condition as follow: 
    
 
  
' '
1
'
'
1
''
'' ''
0( 1,2,..., )
( 1,2,..., )
1 0( 1, 2,..., )
n
i i i i
ii
n
i
i
i
ii i
i i
i i
L v s u s i
s
v s
v i n
uu s
ds ds
v u i n
d d
   
 
 
 


 
                               


n  
(21) 
Combining the above equations, we have 
,   ( 1, 2,..., )
i
i P
A P
ds i
d

  

  n          (22) 
Such that 
''
'P
v
v
    and 
''
'i
i
A
i
u
u
   , (   (23) 1,2,..., )i  n
We assume that 
 
i
i P
i
A P
ds
d
    

  ,    (24) ( 1,2,..., )i  n
Then    
0
i i is t dt

      ,      (25) ( 1, 2,..., )i  n
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We note if P  and iA ( 1, 2,..., )i n  are constants 
(no relation with their levels of income), the optimal 
contract is linear, i.e. 
 i is i                   (26) 
Now, the improved risk programming model is given 
as follows: 
1 2
2
, ,..., 1
1
min 2n
n
i i
i
RC
  
2  

  


              (27) 
Such that 
     1 2, , ,...,
  ( 1, 2,..., )
i i n i i iu s f a a a d C a u
i n
    

    (28) 
     '1 2, , ,...,
  ( 1,2,..., )
ii i a n i i
u s f a a a d C a
i n
   

  
i

      (29) 
,   ( 1, 2,..., )i iRC R i n                      (30) 
1
n
i
i
RC R

                               (31) 
   1 2
1
, ,..., arg max
n
n
i
E v s    

            (32) 
3.4 The Optimal Contract of Risk Allocation 
with Asymmetric Information to Multiple 
Partners 
We then discuss the case of risk allocation with asym-
metric information involving an owner and n risk-averse 
partners in a VE. As the partners’ action can’t be ob-
served, the owner has to incentive to prevent the partners 
from free riding. So the incentive constraints are neces-
sary. The owner’s objective is to maximize the utility of 
its own profit by allocating the total revenue from the VE 
project including choosing  is   and incentive the 
partners . The model is given as follows: ( 1, 2,..., )i  n
d
       1 2, ,..., 1max n
n
is s s i
E v s    
             
   1 2
1
, , ,...,
n
i n
i
v s f a a a  

     

    (33) 
Such that  
     1 2, , ,...,
( 1, 2,..., )
i i n i i iu s f a a a d C a u
i n
    

    (34) 
     '1 2, , ,...,
  ( 1,2,..., )
ii i a n i i
u s f a a a d C a
i n
   

         (35) 
We then construct the Lagrangian function: 
      
   
    
  
    
 
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
1
1 2
1
'
, ,...,
, , ,...,
  , , ,...,
     
 , , ,...,
     
i
n
n
i n
i
n
i i i n
i
i i i
n
i i i a n
i
i i
L s s s
v s f a a a d
u s f a a a d
C a u
u s f a a a d
C a
  
   
   
  



    

 



 
  
 (36) 
where i  and i ( 1, 2,..., )i n are the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers of participation constraints and the incentive con-
straints respectively. The optimal conditions are given as 
below:  
 
  
 
 
'
1 21
'
1 2
, , ,...,
, , ,...,
i
n
i
a ni
i i
ni i
v s f a a a
f a a au s
    

     

  (37) 
Compared with (21), it shows that, if the owner cannot 
observe a, the Pareto efficiency risk allocation is impos-
sible. The partners have to bare more risks. 
4. A Specific Example 
In this section, in order to have a better understanding of 
our models in section 3, we process example analyses to 
make further investigation. To simplify the analysis, we 
employ Linear sharing rules, Exponential utility, and 
normally distributed random variables in this paper, i.e., 
adopt agency model developed by Holmstrom and Mil-
grom [20] which has been proved to be much more trac-
table in addressing multi-action and multi-period models. 
This assumption does not affect the core issue, and the 
total output of the VE is assumed to be a linear function 
of the partners’ productive efforts, which is extended 
from the simple model Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) 
proposed. The total output of the VE is: 
1
n
i
i
a 

  , and   subjects to normal distribution 
2(0, )N  . 
Therefore  
1
n
i
i
E a

  ,   2Var    
Then  i is i     ,  ( 1, 2,..., )i n
And    
1 1
n n
i i
i i i
s s
1
n
i   
 
   

    
The owner’s expected utility is given by 
 
1 1
1
n n
i i
i i
E v s
1
n
i
i
    
 
              
    
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It is assumed that the marginal cost is increasing in the 
level of effort and the cost function takes the quadratic 
form [21], to simplify the analysis, we assume that the 
cost function is continuously differentiable and strictly 
convex and take the form: 
  21
2i i i i
C a b a  
And  is the coefficient (marginal cost). Partner i’s 
actual revenue is 
ib
    2
1
1
2
n
i i i i i i i i i
i
s C a a b a    

          
As the owner and every partner have constant absolute 
risk aversion, which implies its utility function is of the 
negative exponential form. Then, we make the usual 
transformation of expected utility into mean-variance 
terms as follows [22]: 
  2 2
2 2 2
1
1
2
1 1  
2 2
i i i
n
i i i i i i
i
E
a b
   
    


    ia
      (38) 
And 2 21
2 i i
    is partner ’s risk cost. If i a   
 can be observed, the owner can decide 
. The model is given as follows:  
 1 2, ,..., na a a
 , ,i i ia 


   , , 1 1max 1i i i
n n
i ia i i
E v     
            
Such that 
2 2 2
1
1 1
2 2
( 1, 2,..., )
n
i i i i i i i
i
a b
i n
ia      

       


 
i  is the reservation utility. The maximization problem 
can be formulated as: 
 
2 2 2
, 1 1 1
1 1max
2 2i i
n n n
i i i i ia i i i
f a b a      
        
 
The optimality conditions are 
2 0,   1 0
                  ( 1, 2,..., )
i i i i
i i
f f b a
a
i n
  
       

      (39) 
i.e., 1i
i
a
b
  ,  and 0i   12i i ib 
           (40) 
The Pareto efficiency risk allocation requires the part-
ners to bear no risk . If  can-
not be observed, the owner can decide 
( 0i   ) 

 1 2, ,..., na a a a
 ,i i  .The part- 
ners choose the action a to maximize their expected util-
ity: 
      
1 2
1 2, ,...,
max , , ,...,
n
i i i ia a a
u s f a a a  na d C   
The partial derivative with respect to   is 
      1 2, , ,...,
   ( 1, 2,..., )
ii i a n i
u s f a a a a
i n
 

 'id C   
Since i ib ai  , ii
i
a
b
   the problem 
can be transformed into the following form 
( 1,2,i  ..., )n
1 1
i i  ,max 1i i
n n
i i
f a   
            
Such that 
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1
   ( 1, 2,..., )
          ( 1,2,..., )
n
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i
i
i
i
a
i n
a i
b
21 1
2 2 i i
a b
n
    


       

 
  
 
The problem can then be further transformed to the 
following problem: 
2
2 2
1 1 1
2
1 1max
2 2
1 0   ( 1,2,..., )
i
n n n n
i i
i i i
i i i ii i
i
i i
i i i
f
b b
f i n
b b

 
1
   
  
   
        
     
   
 
Here we note that 
2
1 0
1i i ib
    ,  ( 1, 2,..., )i n
This also means that the partners must bear certain risk. 
While we can see i  is a deceasing function in i ,  
and 
ib
2 . In other words, the risks the partners bear are 
negatively correlated to their risk aversion levels and the 
output variances. Now partner i’s risk costs is given by 
 
2
2 2
22
1 0
2 2 1
  ( 1,2,..., )
i
i i i
i i
RC
b
i n
   
 
  



 
5. Multi-principal Models 
In this section, we extend the principal-agent framework 
with risk-neutral principals to situations in which several 
principals simultaneously and independently attempt to 
influence a common agent that is considering the case of 
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n
multi principal agency relationships of the members in 
VE which involving  risk-neutral principals and a 
risk-aversion agent. We analyze the moral hazard and 
give optimal contract. To facilitate our discussion, we 
define the following notations and impose the following 
assumptions. 
n
{1, 2,..., }N  , the set of principals; 
ia , the productive effort of the agent to the principal ; i
M , the upper bound productive effort of the agent to 
the principals; 
 , the uncertain variance the agent can’t control, and 
it subjects to normal distribution 2(0, )N  ; 
( , )i i ia  
ia
, the monetary income (outputs) of the 
effort ; 
( )i i is s  , the incentive contract (a way to repay the 
agent with respect to ); ia
( )iC a , the cost function of efforts ; ia
( ) ( ( ))i i iv x v s i   , the principal ’s utility function i
1
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
n
i i i i
i
u x u s C a

  , the agent’s utility function 
respectively; 
i , the actual profit from principal ; i
0i  , the opportunities income (reservation income) 
of that the principal  guarantees; i
In the multi-principal model, we assume that the total 
productive effort of the agent has a limited M , which 
means the resources are limited and guarantees the 
boundedness of the solution. Because there are multiple 
principals, the model becomes more complex. As the 
relationship between the principals may affect the results 
of the model, we consider the competition relationships 
(non-cooperative). The model is given as follows: Every 
principal give a ( )i is   non-cooperatively, the agent’s 
objective is to maximize the utility of its own total profit 
by allocating the total revenue from the VE project in-
cluding choosing every , ia ( 1,2,..., )i n : 
    max ( ( )i i i is E v s    
. .( ) ( ( ( ))) ( )
  ( 1, 2,..., )
i i i i is t IR u E u s C a
i n
i  


 
1
( ) max
n
i
i
IC u

 u  
1
n
i
i
a M

  
In order to have a better understanding of the multi- 
principal models in this section, we process example 
analyses to make further investigation. To simplify the 
analysis, we employ Linear sharing rules, Exponential 
utility, i.e., adopt agency model developed by Holmstrom 
and Milgrom [20] which has been proved to be much 
more tractable in addressing multi-action and multi-pe-
riod models, and consider the case of two principals. This 
assumption does not affect the core issue. We add the 
following assumptions: 
0ik  , the agent to principal i’s effort level to the im-
pact factor of the marginal output; 
( , )i i i i ia k a     
i
, the output of the agent to 
principal ; 
i , the fixed remuneration of member enterprise ; i
0i 
i
, the revenue sharing factor of member enter-
prise ; 
 , the agent’s risk aversion level; 
21( )
2i
C a ba i
i
, the cost of ; ia
( )i is      , linear sharing rules; 
21
2i i i i
b a      i . 
For principal 1, 
  
1, 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
1 2
max ( ( )) (1 )
1 1. .( )
2 2
( ) max
v E v s k a
s t IR u k a ba
IC u u u
a a M
     
    
     
    
 
 
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For principal 2, 
  
2, 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
max ( ( )) (1 )
1 1. .( )
2 2
( ) max
v E v s k a
s t IR u k a ba
IC u u u
a a M
     
    
     
    
 
 
2
 
To solve the above models, we construct the Lagran-
gian function as follows: 
1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
( )
1 1  
2 2
1 1    
2 2
    ( )
L u u a a M
k a ba
k a ba
a a M

   
2   

    
   
   
  
 
  is the Lagrange multiplier. We then consider the 
first-order condition as follow: 
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1 1 1
1
2 2 2
2
1 2
0
0
0
L k ba
a
L k ba
a
L a a M
 
 

                
 
So the optimal productive effort is 
1 1 2 2
1
2 2 1 1
2
2 2
2 2
k kMa
b
k kMa
b
 
 


     
 
Substituting ,  into the principal 1’s object 
function, the optimal problem is: 
1a

2a

1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1
2 2
1 1
1 1max
2 2
1( ) (
2 2 2 2 2
1   
2
v k a ba
k k k kM Mk b
b
   
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  
    
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 
)
b

  
The first-order condition on the 1 : 
1
1
0
v

   
Then the optimal solution is 
2
1 1 1 2 2
1 2 2
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
4
1 1
2 2
k k bM k k
k b
k a ba
 
1  


           
Similarly, we can solve the optimal solution to the 
principal 2: 
2
2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
4
1 1
2 2
k k bM k k
k b
k a ba
 
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

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From the above , , 1a

2a

1   and 2  , we can analy-
sis their mutual relationships and conclude that. The de-
cision-making influences each other, when the other 
conditions had been given; the efforts of the agent de-
pend on the strength of incentives of all principals. And 
the intensity of incentives weakens each other. These 
hypothesizes are also supported by many realistic cases. 
6. Conclusions 
Virtual enterprise is the main form of cooperation be-
tween enterprises today. Researching on the risk alloca-
tion in VE has both theoretical and practical importance. 
On the basis of the introduction of the concepts of risk 
analysis, this paper mainly describes the risk allocation 
of VE based on the principal-agent theory and draws the 
following conclusions: if the owner cannot observe the 
partners’ efforts level, the Pareto efficiency risk alloca-
tion is impossible to achieve. In other words, the partners 
must bear certain risks, and the risks the partners bearing 
are negatively correlated to his risk aversion level and the 
output variance. For the perfection of the problem, we 
consider the case of multiple principal based on common 
agency in Section 5. To simplify the analysis and explore 
the implications of the risk allocation mechanism, we 
have made some restrictions to the example in section 4, 
such as linear/quadratic forms, independence, normal 
distribution, etc. In the future research, we will relax 
these restrictions to investigate the allocation mechanism 
under much more general environment, and consider the 
incentive mechanism when the relationship between the 
principals is cooperative. 
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